Case law and legal doctrineCriminal lawImpersonating the account holder at the counter: fraud is not undone by the bank’s control failures

The facts and the procedural route

• A bank branch located in Lugones
• Verbal identification by the defendant as the account holder
• Supply of details from the real holder’s identity document and email address
• Withdrawal of 1,500 euros in cash
• Previous convictions for similar fraud offences
• Sentence of three years and six months, a fine of 1,890 euros and compensation of 1,500 euros plus interest
• The judgment is not final: an appeal in cassation remains available

The legal keys

• Sufficient deception: objective capacity to cause error
• Error on the part of the bank employee as intermediary
• Act of disposal of assets causing loss to the bank
• Intent to profit established by the cash withdrawal
• Weak internal controls do not exonerate the offender
• Victim self-endangerment has very limited scope in fraud

The structure of fraud in impersonation cases

The offence of fraud requires deception sufficient to cause error in another, an act of disposal of assets carried out as a result of that error, loss, and intent to profit. In cases of impersonation before a bank these elements are clearly present: the deception consists in asserting another person’s identity backed by genuine personal data, the error is suffered by the employee handling the transaction, and the disposal materialises in handing over the cash.

Sufficient deception and the supply of genuine data

A nuance deserves attention. What gives the deception its capacity is not the bare lie about identity, which anyone could tell, but its support with verifiable personal information: the identity document number and the real holder’s email address. That combination conveys to the employee an appearance of legitimacy that crosses the threshold of what case law calls sufficient deception, that is, apt to overcome the ordinary precautions required in everyday dealings.

Rejection of the defence based on internal controls

The defence argued that the bank’s identification protocols were deficient and that this should bear on the characterisation of the offence. The court rejects that approach with reasoning worth retaining. Any negligence by the victim or its employees does not erase the deception, nor does it render lawful the conduct of the person who deploys it with intent to profit. The doctrine of victim self-endangerment operates in fraud with very restricted scope, reserved for cases of a total absence of elementary diligence, and not for the mere imperfection of a protocol.

The relevance of previous convictions

The ruling notes that the defendant had previous convictions for similar fraud offences. That fact does not alter the characterisation of the offence, but it does bear on sentencing and potentially on the aggravating circumstance of recidivism under Article 22(8) of the Criminal Code, as well as on the prognosis required for any suspension of the sentence.